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Abstract
The NHS and public sector have an unhappy history in relation to the successful introduction of computer 
systems. Procurement processes place responsibility for the efficacy of the software squarely with the 
providers, yet failures still occur. However, other sectors (eg the avionics and nuclear industries) have 
continued success because the criticality of their systems means that failure cannot be countenanced. 
This paper argues that there is much to be learned by the NHS and public sector from these other sectors, 
and benefits to accrue by adopting similar approaches. This would mean that improved Governmental 
procurement processes and governance arrangements need to be put in place that anticipate the fact 
that service delivery is becoming increasingly dependent on software-based technologies, where critical-
ity is relevant.
Introduction
The NHS and other organisations in the public sector require providers of software-based 
systems to have standards that ensure the efficacy of their software. Of course, the provid-
ers do have standards, yet problems continue to occur which add to the unhappy history of 
public services, in terms of successfully introducing computer systems. This suggests that 
current standards are not adequate.
This paper asks the question of whether there would be benefits in the public sector 
adopting the rigorous approach that applies in certain other sectors where criticality is 
dominant.
Current approach to software validation
The current Governmental approach places the onus on providers to ensure the efficacy of 
software. For example, in November 2004 the Minister of State for Health, referring to the 
National Programme for Information Technology’s Local Service Providers (LSPs)1, stated 
that the procedure for accepting any software into the National Programme is extremely 
strict, and responsibility lies with the LSPs. Therefore it is “in their highest interests to 
assure themselves of the quality of software engineering” 1; something that cannot be done 
collectively or by proxy.
Reference was made to major subcontractors being accredited to the Carnegie Mellon 
Software Institute’s Capability Maturity Model, Level five (CMM5)2. Meeting this standard 
was quoted as being “very demanding”, with any LSP “which did not deliver an appropriately 
high quality of product for National Programme software” subject to incurring “a very high 
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cost” 1. This is clearly a defensible stance for any commissioning organisation. The onus for 
ensuring software standards is clearly placed on the provider and if the software falls short 
of meeting what is stated in the specification then the commissioner will place penalties on 
the provider (according to the severity of the shortfall).
But CMM52 requires an entire organisation to be focused on continual process improve-
ment, ie it has the means to identify weaknesses and strengthen processes proactively, with 
the goals of preventing defects and improving efficiency. However, this is not the same as re-
quiring affiliates to show that their software is free from defects and faults: it simply requires 
a reduction of defects from previous CMM5 levels to be attained. Therefore when errors or 
problems do arise with software they are addressed, either with a patch or an appropriate 
re-write. Of course, such problems will not necessarily arise during implementation itself, but 
may occur at a later stage when certain circumstances apply.  This is only acceptable when 
there is little or no criticality associated with such systems and software. But as health care 
and other public services become increasingly dependent on systems and equipment that use 
software how long will this be the case? Why should the public sector not require the very 
highest standards and best practice, as espoused in other fields and professions?
Sectors where the criticality of software is paramount
Imagine if the same approach as that described above for the public sector was applied to the 
avionics and the nuclear industries? An aeroplane full of passengers is flying at 30,000 feet 
when the software goes wrong: what are the potential implications? It is not really practical 
for the pilot to send an email to the software provider to ask for something to be done as 
soon as possible. Criticality is central where software failure can be life critical, and relates 
to equipment as well as systems. Therefore, the efficacy of software standards in these sec-
tors is paramount and the assurance and audit systems that are put in place are aimed at 
ensuring that software works first time and every time.
The motivations can vary between sectors: legal costs and industrial image (avionics); reli-
ability of mechanical exchanges (telecommunications); recall costs (automobile); and avoiding 
disaster (nuclear). The approach applied in sectors where criticality is key requires software 
to be formally regulated by the main responsible organisation(s) (eg the Federal Aviation 
Authority in relation to avionics in the USA). Standards are agreed by consensus and applied 
industry-wide (eg DO-178B3 and IEC 615084). It helps if there is a long-established culture 
of co-operation.
Having set the standards the key question is then how to check that quality is actually in 
place? This requires the installation of appropriate audit and validation mechanisms. From 
a technical perspective, to ensure that there is no, or minimal, risk of error, the quality of 
any software can only be satisfactorily checked by analysing the source code; and in prac-
tice analysing the source code needs to be automated so as to cover potential permutations 
and combinations. To do this, software providers audit/validate their software through the 
application of thorough analysis tools provided by specialist companies (many of which are 
based in the UK). The services provided include static and dynamic analyses capabilities, 
the provision of tools, software toolkits, and training.
Of course, the results of the application of such audit/validation need to be appropriately 
acted upon. To this end, software providers in critical arenas often have a designated engi-
neering representative (DER), or equivalent, to enforce the quality of software. This person 
can be an employee of the software provider, but he/she is invested with full responsibility 
for checking the software and ensuring that it meets the set requirements. In avionics in 
the USA, the DER has to sign a contract to say that they can personally be prosecuted if 
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standards are not met! Therefore no software can be released unless and until it has been 
signed off by the DER. This is essential because failure really matters where it is life critical. 
As a result of this type of approach high reliability can be and is achieved.
Why hasn’t the NHS and the public sector adopted such standards and 
approaches?
Procurement processes in the public sector are usually competitive and involve a fixed price. 
They place the risk for software quality with the service or software provider. Arguably, this is 
a politically pragmatic approach: Ministers can advise Parliament that the efficacy of software 
has been addressed by providers being required to meet established quality standards, backed 
up by applying penalties where things go wrong. The drivers for public sector procurement 
can also include ambitious deadlines to support political programmes, where Ministers wish 
to see demonstrable changes and improvements in services. Service and software providers 
have often played catch-up as the specifications for computer systems can only really be 
finalised once the change/improvement programme they are meant to support have been 
finalised. Also, by their very nature Government systems are large and are therefore only 
likely to attract interest from large software providers. 
Setting specification requirements such as a need to meet CMM52 is a straightforward 
option for public sector procurement, because something has to be included in respect of 
software quality and an approach similar to that for critical systems would require clear, 
identified standards to be set in the first place.
Given the above, perverse incentives can apply: providers are working within tight finance 
and time constraints; if stated quality requirements are satisfactorily met then is there merit 
in software checks to the levels involved in critical systems? – if anything were found then 
rewriting adds costs and time; and there could be legal liabilities/ obligations if defects are 
found. Ignorance can be bliss!
Figure 1. Criticality in NHS and public sector systems
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Criticality in future systems
Criticality may not be central to many health/public sector systems at the present time, 
but future developments in systems and medical equipment are likely to raise its profile. 
Figure 1 provides an illustration of how criticality might be related to NHS/ public sector 
systems and equipment:
•	 mission-critical systems are those that would not endanger life if they went wrong;
•	 safety-related systems are those that do not endanger life directly if they go wring, but 
the consequences of their going wrong could potentially lead to this; and
•	 safety-critical systems are those that directly endanger life if they go wrong.
What might be the potential benefits of the NHS/public sector adopting such 
standards and approaches?
There are genuine potential benefits accruing from improving the approach to ensuring the 
efficacy of software:
Political benefits
•	 The political temperature has been rising for some time in respect to improving the efficacy of systems 
and the need for good governance.
Technical benefits
•	 Remove software faults and defects, and ensure third party software is of appropriate 
quality.
•	 Maximise the security of systems to guard against hackers and assure integrity in multi-
user, sharing environments.
•	 Identify and address unexpected and unwanted functionality.
•	 Attempt to speed up developments can involve multiple teams, leading to the potential for ‘code bloat’ 
where common elements that should be developed once and shared are inadvertently duplicated. 
Quality benefits
•	 Ensure best practice.
•	 Generic tools and products can be applied to practically any software from any country.
•	 Big reductions in risk.
Financial benefits
•	 A report was commissioned by the EEC to investigate the improvement of software quality through 
improved testing. This project is the Prevention of Errors through Experience-driven Test Efforts 
(PET) ESSI Project No.104385-7. The PET project objectives were to reduce the number of bugs 
reported after release by 50%, and reduce the hours of test effort per defect found by 40%. Both of 
these goals were met by using available technologies. The actual numbers achieved were 75% less 
defects reported and a 46% improvement in test efficiency.
•	 Efficient processes that minimise the need to correct and re-test software are clearly cost-effective. 
Being able to demonstrate the application of such processes is also relevant for due diligence and 
can contribute to legal defence.
•	 The benefits of defect removal are not only financial and temporal, there is also the collateral benefit 
of user satisfaction through the higher dependability of the software products.
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NHS-specific benefits
•	 Security is key.
•	 The NHS is subject to many pressures that will change the requirements and ground rules 
for IM&T. These are political, organisational, managerial, clinical and technological, and 
such changes can occur within a short space of time. The NHS is also one of the biggest 
and most complex organisations in the world. With the ongoing process of modernisation, 
the NHS will look very different in, say, ten years time to what it looks like now.
•	 The NHS track record in specifying its requirements is not necessarily a good one. As 
the NHS changes, so will its requirements, and it is not necessarily possible to anticipate 
these. Therefore LSPs will face a continually evolving specification, which could end up 
very different to what was originally foreseen. LSPs will endeavour to develop their soft-
ware systems in line with such changes, but there is a real danger that they will become 
stretched and subject to unexpected and unwanted functionality. Therefore it is absolutely 
essential to ensure that all new software (modules) are able to fully integrate with exist-
ing systems at each and every stage, whether that software has been developed in-house 
or bought in.
•	 Criticality will become increasingly important within NHS computer systems and medical 
equipment, as professionals become increasingly dependent upon them to deliver patient 
care. In an increasingly litigious NHS, it is highly probable that at some point a patient’s 
death or suffering could be attributed to software problems, with consequences for the 
company responsible.
Conclusions
There is always likely to be tension between the desire of politicians and procurers in the 
public sector to acquire systems and implement them as quickly as possible, and the time 
dictated by the logistics and demands of assurance and audit processes where the criticality 
of software is key. This needs to be fully recognised and taken into account as the Govern-
ment moves from a position of itself being a (main) producer of software to one of having 
a customer focus. Equally, full account must be taken of the risk that a provider might fail 
in its service delivery – possibly due to problems with its software – because where this 
happens considerable time, effort and money is lost, and things can be back to square one. 
Consequently public sector procurement processes and requirements need to ensure the 
efficacy of the software used by providers. However, whether there is suitable intelligence 
within Governmental agencies around the subject area of auditing the criticality of software 
is uncertain.
Criticality in respect of healthcare systems is self-evident in many cases, and its impor-
tance is only likely to grow over time as service delivery becomes increasingly dependent on 
software-based technologies. The Government has to anticipate this and plan accordingly. 
The mechanisms for an improved approach are known and therefore the question has 
to be asked “Why not?” Undoubtedly there will need to be a tailoring of the approach for 
the public sector. For example, might DERs relate to the Health and Safety Executive?  The 
situation of where providers use commercial off-the-shelf software might present issues in 
terms of accessing source code.  Nevertheless, the debate and decisions about how to max-
imise the efficacy of software-based systems for the public sector need to take place sooner 
rather than later.
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